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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER TRANSPORT DIVISION TWENTY-SIX
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

FP7-4YA16-3
Serial 0202

394
1 04018

C-S-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

15 January 1945

From: The Commander Transport Division TWENTY-SIX.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: (1) The Commander Transport Group and Task Unit 78.5.1.
(2) The Commander Task Group 78.5.
(3) The Commander Task Force 78.
(4) The Commander Allied Naval Forces, and
The Commander SEVENTH Fleet (CTF 77).
(5) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

References: (a) PacFlt Conf Ltr 2CL-44 of 1 January 1944.
(b) Article 712(1), U. S. Navy Regulations.
(c) Article 874(6), U. S. Navy Regulations.
(d) Alnav No. 215.
(e) Commander Luzon Attack Force (CTF 77) OpPlan No. 17-44.
(f) Commander San Fabian Attack Force (CTF 78) OpPlan No. 103-44.
(g) ComPhibGrpEIGHT (CTG 78.5) Attack Order No. 2-44.
(h) CTU 78.5.1 Landing Plan (Annex C to Ref. (e))

Enclosures: (A) Action Report, U. S. S. CALLAWAY (APA35).
(B) Action Report, U. S. S. SUMTER (APA52).
(C) Action Report, U. S. S. STORM KING (AF171).
(D) Action Report, U. S. S. MONITOR (LSV5).
(E) Action Report, U. S. S. GUNSTON HALL (LSD5).

missing

PART I

1. General Narrative of Action.

At 0933 Zone-9 Time on 9 January 1945, Task Unit 78.5.3 commenced landing troops and equipment of the 20th Regiment, 6th Infantry Division, 6th Army on Blue Two Beach, LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands. The landing operation was carried out pursuant to and in accordance with the operation orders described in references (e), (f), (g) and (h). No immediate opposition was encountered on shore, and the landing of the assault waves proceeded according to schedule. Blue One Beach, immediately adjacent and to the left of Blue Two, was considered more accessible to LSMs and LSTs than Blue Two, and consequently all such craft in the task group, after the initial assault waves, were despatched to that beach. The necessity of shifting the small boat unloading area from the right flank of Blue Two to an area approximately between the Blue One and Blue Two beaches produced a short delay in the progress of unloading ships of the task unit. However, unloading generally proceeded rapidly, and all ships less JUPITER and FREMONT were unloaded by 1700, 9 January 1945, and departed the area as part of Task Unit 79.14.1, under the command of Commodore Loomis, U. S. N., in the USS LEONARD WOOD. The JUPITER and FREMONT remained in the area for the completion of unloading, as planned in references (e), (f), (g) and (h).

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

15 January 1945

Subject: Action Report -- Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

2. Preliminaries.

Task Unit 78.5.3 was composed of USS CALLAWAY, USS FREMONT, JUPITER, USS SUMTER, USS STORM KING, USS MONITOR and USS GUNSTON HALL, with CTU 78.5.3 in the CALLAWAY. The operation, insofar as this task unit was concerned, was staged from SANSAPOR, New Guinea, the ships being combat loaded in this area during the period 15 to 18 December, 1944. The landing plan was rehearsed on 25 December 1944 with substantial benefit resulting, inasmuch as problems incident to the assembling of the LVT waves had been a matter of some concern. Troops were reembarked for the operation on 26 December 1944, and remained aboard from this date until their assault landing on 9 January 1945. The task unit got underway for LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon, on 30 December 1944, in company with other ships of Task Group 78.5, under the command of Rear Admiral Fechtler, U. S. Navy, in the FREMONT. On the same date, and while still in SANSAPOR, a "Jake" type enemy plane was shot down over the area, with official credit given to the CALLAWAY.

Task Unit 78.5.3 proceeded from SANSAPOR, New Guinea to LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands, as part of Task Group 78.5. The composition of this group, and the composition and movements of other groups involved in the operation, were as described in references (e), (f), (g) and (h). The early phases of the voyage were characterized by frequent "Flash Reds" and, while passing through the MINDANAO Sea, by the imminent danger of submarine attacks, but the task unit came through these incidents without damage or casualties. The passage through the inland waters of the PHILIPPINE Islands, through the SULU Sea, and out into the SOUTH CHINA Sea, passed without incident, except for continued "Flash Reds" that failed to materialize into air attacks on Task Group 78.5, until the night of 7 January 1945, when a cruiser and destroyer force accompanying the task group intercepted and destroyed an enemy destroyer. During the same night the task group was under intermittent enemy air attack, and one LST suffered minor damage to the ship and casualties among personnel. On the morning of 8 January 1945, the Task Group was again under air attack. One "Tony" type plane dropped bombs between the SUMTER and CALLAWAY without hitting either ship. The plane then flew over the CALLAWAY and was hit by her guns, banked back and crashed into the bridge on the starboard side. Further mention is made of this matter in appropriate parts of this report, and it is described in detail in the action report of the CALLAWAY, enclosed herein as enclosure (A), to which reference is made. As a result of this crash dive the number 1 davit and four LCVPs were put out of commission, in addition to other materiel injuries, described in detail in enclosure (A). The crash dive also resulted in severe casualties among ship and staff personnel, also described in detail elsewhere.

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15 January 1945.

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

The remainder of 8 January 1945 passed without incident. At about 0600, 9 January, CTU 78.5.3 and other division commanders were directed to take charge of their divisions and proceed independently. At 0730, 9 January, this Task Unit arrived in the transport area off Blue Beach, LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon, and commenced the scheduled operation. The direction of the wind was easterly 2 knot in the morning, the sea was smooth, and visibility good after bombardment smoke was cleared. Immediately after arrival of ships in the transport area, CTU 78.5.3 left the flagship (USS CALLAWAY) and proceeded to PC 1133 to assume the duties of Task Group Control Officer (CTU 78.5.7). A separate report covers the action of that command.

PART II

1. Chronological Account of Action.

The assault landing on Blue Two Beach, as participated in by Task Unit 78.5.3, began at approximately 0730, 9 January 1945, when transports anchored in the outer transport area and commenced disembarking troops. The organization and forming up of LVT and boat waves, the launching of LCTs from the GUNSTON HALL and DUKWs from the MONITOR, and other details of the landing plan proceeded in accordance with reference (h). No mishap prevented the scheduled despatching of waves, and in all respects the landing proceeded very smoothly. A time study of the landing on Blue Two Beach is given below:

Wave	Scheduled to leave LOD	Left LOD	Scheduled to Land	Landed
1	0900	0900	0930	0933
2	0901	0901	0930.5	0935
3	0905	0905	0935	0937
4	0910	0910	0940	0940
5	0915	0915	0945	0944
6	0933	0933	0950	0950
7	0938	0938	0955	0955
8	0943	0943	1000	0959
9	0948	0948	1005	1009
10	0953	0957	1010	1018
11	0958	1002	1015	1022
12	1013	1015	1030	1035
13	1028	1028	1045	1045
14	1033	1033	1050	1051
15	1038	1038	1055	1103

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CONFIDENTIAL

15 January 1945.

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

The assault waves met no opposition on Blue Two Beach, and all landing craft including LCTs and LSMs were quickly unloaded and returned to designated transports for unloading, in accordance with reference (h). Nucleus beach parties from the CALLAWAY, SUMTER and STORM KING landed behind the troops and organized the beach for unloading. Due to favorable landing conditions for small boats, the use of unloading details in the boats and the willing help of native labor, the unloading of these three ships progressed favorably despite the availability of only two D-4 bulldozers, few trucks and no cranes. Moreover, no shore party personnel were made available for the unloading of boats until approximately 1400 in the afternoon. The MONITOR relied heavily for her unloading on approximately thirty DUKWs carried by her to the area. Her unloading was delayed at first by the fact that very many DUKWs had insufficient gas to return to the ship after their initial landings and that there was considerable delay in unloading the DUKWs. It is believed that the gas difficulty was caused partly by the distance of the MONITOR from the beach, and partly by the fact that the DUKWs were not fully gassed on leaving the ship on their initial trip. This is the subject of comment elsewhere in this report.

At about noon on 9 January 1945, it was found necessary for a variety of reasons to shift the unloading area about a mile to a place on, or adjacent to the right flank of Blue One Beach. The shore party pool operated from this location. The LSMs and LSTs from which almost all the bulldozers, trucks and cranes had been unloaded had landed nearby, and it was felt unwise to rely entirely on native labor for unloading boats on Blue Two Beach. Furthermore, the main road arteries and supply dumps had been established by the army in this area and army authorities desired to fit the unloading of Blue Two shipping into this system. The moving of the unloading area to the new location held up the unloading of boats for about an hour, but it is believed that substantial overall benefits resulted. With the help of a shore party consisting of about 150 troops, and with an increased availability of bulldozers, trucks and cranes, all ships of Task Unit 78.5.3 except the JUPITER and FREMONT were unloaded and beach parties withdrawn by 1700, 9 January 1945. At about 1945 these ships departed the area as part of Task Unit 79.14.1 (OTC Commodore Loomis, USN, in LEONARD WOOD), leaving the JUPITER and FREMONT to complete unloading, as planned.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

15 January 1945

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

PART III

1. Performance of own ordnance material and equipment.

Reference is made to enclosure (A) for detailed analysis of the circumstances attending the crash dive of an enemy plane against the CALLAWAY on the morning of 8 January 1945. It is to be noted from this enclosure (A) that all guns that could bear continued firing on this plane until the moment of impact, including number 13, 20 mm gun, which continued to pour fire into the plane until it was completely demolished by the force of the collision. Enclosure (B) and (C) likewise report 20 mm hits on the plane as it flew over the column. Subsequent to the crash, over twenty 20 mm shell holes were counted in the wing, the only part of the plane that remained relatively intact. It thus may be taken as a fact that the plane was subjected to extremely heavy and accurate fire and was in fact riddled by 20 mm shell holes at the time it hit the ship. Nevertheless, the plane was sufficiently under control to enable its pilot to crash the plane into the CALLAWAY. It is submitted from this evidence that, as a result of actual combat experience, it is demonstrably proven that 20 mm guns are insufficient armament to protect a transport against this type of attack, and it is recommended that, to the maximum extent possible, 40 mm guns replace the present 20 mm guns as standard armament for the transport type ship. |||

2. Performance of enemy ordnance material and equipment.

No comment.

PART IV

1. Own battle damage.

Reference is made to Enclosure (A).

2. Enemy battle damage.

Damage directly inflicted on the enemy by Task Unit 78.5.3 include two enemy planes shot down by the CALLAWAY and one enemy plane shot down by the MONITOR. Reference is made to enclosure (A) and (D) for detailed accounts of the actions.

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PART V

1. Planning and assault phase.

(a) It is believed that a closer liaison between the lower echelons of the army and navy in the early planning stage of the past operations would have been helpful. This transport division was located during this period at HOLLANDIA, New Guinea. The army regiment assigned to the transport division was based at SANSAPOR, New Guinea. With the exception of the transport division Transport Quartermaster, who was sent to SANSAPOR to prepare loading plans, there was no opportunity provided for conferences between transport division and regimental planning personnel until the former moved to SANSAPOR, at which time almost all the details of the landing plan were settled and the operation orders prescribing those details were written. As a result the army and navy were committed to certain details of the landing plan, such as boat assignments and wave formation which it is believed could have been planned to better advantage. Therefore, it is recommended that where army and navy units that will work together during an operation are geographically separated during the planning stage, appropriate navy personnel attached to the lower echelons be ordered to the location of the army unit, in order that common problems be settled to the satisfaction of both.

(b) CTU 78.5.5, in command of the eight LSTs carrying Blue Beach LVTs, adopted a system for the simultaneous launching of LVTs for a particular wave from all LSTs on execution by the LST flagship of numeral wave flags. This system worked excellently, and is probably in large part responsible for the orderly and rapid formation of the waves. It is recommended that this system of launching be made standard amphibious doctrine for future operations.

(c) The 6th, 7th and 8th waves landing in assault on Blue Two Beach carried vehicles totalling approximately thirty lifts, eight of which came from one hold. The problem of having these waves meet the time schedule was solved by preloading. This method is considered essential if the tactical plan of the army requires an assault landing on a time basis of boats carrying a substantial amount of equipment requiring lifts. However, it should be recognized that circumstances, particularly the state of the weather, may render preloading impracticable.

(d) LCTs landing in the eleventh wave on Blue Beach were painted in large white numerals with the standard wave numbers. This was very helpful in determining that the LCTs were in their proper position, and it is recommended that this be made standard amphibious doctrine for subsequent operations.

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(e) Control over the operation of smoke boats is at present secured by communications thru SCR 610 radios. A shortage exists with respect to these radios, and they are urgently needed for other uses in an assault operation. It is submitted that control over smoke boats should be had through the use of 536 radios, as the smoke boats will be operating close enough to the ships to be within range, and far enough away from the beach to avoid interference with the beach party and salvage boat 536s. It is therefore recommended that this practice be adopted and made uniform.

(f) Intelligence data on the past operation was meagre, particularly with respect to hydrographic conditions and shore defenses, and the photographic coverage was not as complete as in some past operations. It is recognized that these conditions may have been unavoidable.

(g) LSMs and LSTs were able to land and unload on Blue Beach. However, it was generally believed, on the basis of available information on hydrographic conditions, that this might very well not be the case. It is believed that if LSMs and LSTs had not been able to beach, the dislocation of the unloading program and the reassignment of the unloading lighterage that would inevitably have followed would have caused a certain degree of confusion; and it is recommended that in subsequent operations, where similar circumstances exist, an alternate plan be written to provide for such eventualities, in which all hands may be fully briefed with respect to their duties.

2. Unloading phase.

(a) An adequate shore party is essential to any unloading operation, and no substitute for it can be entirely satisfactory. However, various circumstances can and frequently do deprive ships of the advantages of a shore party, such as heavy opposition on the beach or delay in landing. Under these circumstances the problem of unloading boats may be met in two ways. The first is to have unloading details consisting of ship's personnel carried in the boats. This was necessitated in the past operation, and worked well. However, this system is generally unsatisfactory, mainly because it undermines the ship, and should be adopted only as a last resort. The second possibility lies in native labor. Over half of the small boats used for unloading by the Blue Two S-day shipping were unloaded by native labor, and in a previous operation considerable assistance was had from the same source. In the event that future operations involve landings in places where the natives are likely to have a friendly attitude toward our forces, it is believed that natives will again appear on the beaches ready for work, and that so thought should be given to the full utilization of this source of manpower. Consequently, it is recommended that a language officer be attached to the shore or beach party and land early in the assault with them; that it be his duty to draft native labor and organize it; and that he be authorized to pay native labor for their services if they cannot be had any other way.

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FB7-26/A16-3
Serial 0202

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

15 January 1945

Subject: Action Report -Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
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(b) When a transport division must rely in large measure on its own boats for its unloading, it is recommended that the shore party and bulldozers, cranes and trucks to be used in unloading the boats be carried in the ships of that transport division. This is the best way to insure that the unloading personnel and equipment will in fact be available when cargo starts coming in to the beach. Furthermore, it is recommended that more D-6 and D-8 bulldozers be allocated for purposes of unloading, and be assigned the highest priority in the ships' unloading plans. Two LSMs badly needed at the ships were held up at Blue Beach because bulldozers were being used elsewhere, and finally had to be unloaded by hand.

(c) It is recommended that in an operation where DUKWs land in the assault phase and then are expected to unload ships, one DUKW on its first trip to the beach carry nothing but 50 gallon drums for the establishment of a gas dump. This should not be necessary if DUKWs are fully gassed before leaving the ship, but experience indicates that this cannot always be ensured. Furthermore, a larger percentage of DUKWs should be equipped with A frames, especially as in the early stages there will be no party ashore designated to unload them.

2. Enemy tactics.

(a) Reference is made to enclosure (E) for evidence of enemy crash dive tactics against ship making smoke.

PART VI

1. Communications.

(a) Frequency Plan: The ship-to-shore movement frequency plan filled the communication needs of this Command and was generally satisfactory. The functional distribution of channels was well conceived and could well be adopted as basic in the planning of future operations. A fair distribution of the traffic load was accomplished. The previously encountered congestion on boat control channels particularly was notably reduced. It is therefore recommended that the functional distribution of channels as set up for this operation be adapted as a model in the planning of future amphibious operations.

(b) Circuit Discipline and Procedure: Circuit discipline and voice procedure is constantly improving but much is yet to be desired. The voice circuits are not being actively controlled or monitored and seldom is the net control actually known to the stations on the circuit. When a serious breach of discipline is noted, no one obviously feels responsible and the offending station is not corrected. Several serious breaches of communications security were also noted on voice circuits during current operations. It is therefore recommended that in

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FB7-26/AL6-3
Serial 0202

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

15 January 1945

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
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the basic plan provisions for rigid control and monitoring of all voice circuits be made by specifically designating a station (preferably a senior member) as net control. Net control should be delegated with full responsibility for discipline and security considerations on designated channel. It is further recommended that serious consideration be given to the question of increasingly common violations of communications security particularly while cruising in enemy waters. There is need for a new code for tactical maneuvering voice signals which would allow rapid coding and decoding and still provide a reasonable measure of security by daily change of code or key list.

PART VII

1. Reference is made to enclosure (A) for casualties suffered during past operation.
2. The performance of all personnel, officer and enlisted, was in accordance with the highest traditions of the service.

H. J. Wright
H. J. WRIGHT
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commander Task Unit 78.5.3,
Commander Transport Division TWENTY-SIX.

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7B7-26/A16-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER TRANSPORT DIVISION TWENTY-SIX
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C-O-N-R-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

15 January 1945

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf, Luzon Island,
Philippine Islands.

DISTRIBUTION:

NOTE: - Enclosures forwarded only with original routing.

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CinCPac (5)	ComPhibGrp 8 (2)
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ComSoWPac (2)	CALLAWAY (2)
ComSerForPac (2)	FREMONT (2)
ComPhibsPac (2)	SUMTER (2)
ComPhibsCorpsPac (2)	STORM KING (2)
AdComPhibsPac (2)	JUPITER (2)
Com3rdPhib (2)	MONITOR (2)
Com7thPhib (2)	GUNSON HALL (2)
AdCom7thPhib (2)	ComPhibTra Pac (2)
ComGrp 1 PhibsPac (2)	ComPhibTraLant (2)
ComGrp 2 PhibsPac (2)	Army-Navy Staff College (2)
ComGrp 3 PhibsPac (2)	Naval War College (2)
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ComGrp 6 PhibsPac (2)	

W. F. Wood
W. F. WOOD,
Lieut (jg), USNR,
Staff Secretary.

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

FC7-11/A16-3
Serial: 008

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TRANSPORT SQUADRON ELEVEN
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

(ctb)

S E C R E T

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
22 January 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
ComTransDiv 26 Conf ltr
FB7-26/A16-3 Ser. 0202
dated 15 January 1945.

From: The Commander Transport Squadron ELEVEN.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Group 78.5.
(ComPhibGroup EIGHT, SEVENTH Fleet).
(2) The Commander Task Force 78.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
(3) The Commander Task Force 77.
(Commander Allied Naval Forces, and
the Commander SEVENTH Fleet).

Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN Gulf,
Luzon Island, Philippine Islands.

Reference: (a) Com7thPhibFor Conf ltr Serial 0212
of 17 February 1944.

1. Forwarded.

2. Enclosure (A), (U.S.S. CALLAWAY Action Report) fails to mention several outstanding facts. After being struck by the enemy plane, the CALLAWAY never lost station as guide of her column, quickly overcame the fire and subsequently landed her troops and equipment in a most expeditious manner. The performance of duty by this vessel and her crew is considered to be outstanding. By separate correspondence, the U.S.S. CALLAWAY is being recommended for the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION.

3. The classification of the basic letter and Enclosures is hereby changed to "SECRET" due to use of code words. Commander Transport Division 26 (Temporary) is hereby directed, by copy of this letter, to notify the originators of Enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D), & (E) to basic letter, of this change in classification. Use of code words was noted on Page 2, Para 2 of Enclosure (C), and on Page 1 (top of page) of Enclosure (A) to Enclosure (E) of basic letter. In both cases the phrase "MIKE-ONE" was used.

3 1939

D. W. Loomis
D. W. LOOMIS.

cc:

CTD-26
CO, USS CALLAWAY.

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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

FE25/A16-3
Serial: 0017A

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 8
SEVENTH FLEET
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SECRET

26 February 1945

2nd. ENDORSEMENT to

ComTransDiv26confiltr. FB7-26/
A16-3 Ser. 0202 dated 15 Feb 1945

From: Commander Amphibious Group 8, Seventh Fleet (CTG 78.2)
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subj: Action Reports - TransDiv 26 - LINGAYEN Operation.

1. Forwarded. The performance of Transport Division 26 throughout the operation was excellent. The performance of CALLOWAY in maintaining position in formation while fighting fire and effecting repairs to casualties caused by being crashed by a Japanese plane on 8 January was especially noteworthy. Damage to machinery spaces was neutralized and communication equipment and radars were quickly put back in operation in a short time. Necessary adjustments in organization to overcome loss of four boats and personnel were made so that CALLOWAY carried out its assignments in landing the first transport assault waves without change in schedule.

2. This report and endorsements contain written commendation to Captain D. C. McNeil, USCG, CO, CALLOWAY. By copy of this endorsement, BuPers and Commandant U. S. Coast Guard are requested to make suitable entry in his record.

W. M. Fechteler
W. M. FECHTELER

cc: BuPers
Cdt, USCG

3 1939

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

File FE25/A16-3
Serial: 00133

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
U.S. Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

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A16-3(2)


SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

11 MAR 1945

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on:
ComTransDiv 26 secret
ltr., serial 0202 of
15 January 1945.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force)
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN GULF, LUZON
ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
1. Forwarded.


G. D. MORRISON,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Operations.

Copy to:
CTG 78.2 (ComPhibGrp 8, 7thFlt.)
ComTransRon 11
ComTransDiv 26

3 1939

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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(2)(F-3-4/whr)

Serial 00730

Reg. No. 0M-03667
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24 MAR 1945

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to:
ComTransDiv 26 secret
ltr., serial 0202 of
15 January 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Action Report - Assault of LINGAYEN GULF,
LUZON ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

1. Forwarded.

2. The performance of Transport Division 26 is noted with approval and satisfaction. Captain D. C. McNeil, USCG, the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. CALLOWAY (APA35) and his officers and men are congratulated on the courage and determination with which they successfully completed their assigned mission under conditions of great difficulty.

T. C. Kinkaid

T. C. KINKAID

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